Freeing the Invisible Hand: The Unexpected Consequences of Land Deregulation in Querétaro, Mexico by Casar Rodriguez, Jorge
FREEING THE INVISIBLE 
HAND:
THE UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF 
LAND DEREGULATION IN QUERÉTARO, 
MÉXICO
A Thesis Presented to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning & Preservation
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree





I would like to thank, first and foremost, Elliott Sclar, 
my thesis advisor, for his immensely valuable advise 
throughout the long research process. Countless 
conversations and debates on the injustices of this 
world made this thesis what it is today.
Secondly, my reader Clara Irazábal, for her invaluable 
input and continuous support.
I would also like to thank all those that helped me 
in the very complicated process of gathering data. 
This thesis would not have been possible without all 
those generous hours that were invested in my re-
search. 
All my friends, for their continued encouragment and 
support, have my deepest gratitude.
Last, but definitely not least, I would like to thank 
my family. Absolutely nothing in the past two years 




7 Chapter One: Introduction
10 Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.1 The Invisible Hand: Evolution of Economic 
Policy in Mexico
2.2 Land, Housing and the Free Market: A Histor-
ical Perspective
2.3 Querétaro: Background and Context
46 Chapter Three: Research Design
3.1 Mapping Land Use Changes: 1997-2007
3.2 Mapping Human Settlements in Querétaro
54 Chapter Four: Findings
4.1 Summary
4.2 Mapping Land Use Changes: 1997-2007
4.3 Mapping Human Settlements in Querétaro
4.4 Discussion
75 Chapter Five: Policy Implications
5.1 Regulate Growth
4.2 Promote Regional Governance
4.3 Stimulate a Stronger Rental Market




LIST OF TABLES AND 
FIGURES
Figure 1. Queretaro Metropolitan Zone: Context
Figure 2. Queretaro: Municipal Delegations
Figure 3. Development along the Mexico City - USA Highway
Table 1. Allocated land uses in 1997
Table 2. Allocated land uses in 2007
Figure 4. Land use allocation in 1997
Figure 5. Land use allocation in 2007
Figure 6. Land that went from Protected to Urban in the period of study
Figure 7. Urban extents in 2010 v. total land zoned for development
Figure 8. Identified human settlements
Table 3. Human settlements: Spatial characteristics
Table 4. Informal settlements, by location
Figure 9. Human settlements on land that underwent a land use change
Figure 10. Site 1: Boundaries
Figure 11. Site 1: Aerial view (2015)
Figure 12. Site 1: Street engagement
Figure 13. Site 2: Boundaries
Figure 14. Site 2: Aerial view (2015)
Figure 15. Site 2: Street engagement
Figure 16. Site 3: Boundaries
Figure 17. Site 3: Aerial view (2015)
Figure 18. Site 3: Street engagement
Figure 19. Site 4: Boundaries
Figure 20. Site 4: Aerial view (2015)
Figure 21. Site 4: Street engagement
Figure 22. Site 4: Boundaries
Figure 23. Site 4: Aerial view (2015)






























The purpose of this thesis is to study the relation-
ship between the evolution and sudden shifts in 
broader political economy, and the physical trans-
formation of cities in Mexico. This research relies on 
the city of Querétaro, a case study of uneven urban 
expansion. The research design consists of an in-
depth analysis of historical land use data, as well as 
municipal documentation and Federal census data, 
to study the effects that land use deregulation has 
had on the form of the city. The findings show that, 
in recent years, the city has seen the proliferation of 
both informal settlements and private, gated subdi-
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During the 1980’s decade, after years of protectionist policies that fo-
cused on import substitution and a dependence on primary goods export 
to the United States, the Mexican Federal government drastically shifted 
its approach towards economic policy. Following pressures from major in-
ternational financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, the country started the gradual adoption of a 
market-oriented economy, adopting the rules and precepts of neoliberal-
ism as a guiding economic theory. During the 1990s decade, Mexico’s trans-
formation towards market orientation reached unprecedented levels, and 
the rollout of market-oriented policies continued up to a critical point. In 
fact, after only three decades since the beginning of this drastic economic 
shift, “nowhere has neoliberalism been more widely implemented or its im-
pacts been more profound than in Mexico.”1 
This drastic change in direction towards a market-driven economy, de-
rived from the adoption -or rather, imposition?- of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a foreign-crafted policy, brought with it a series 
of structural adjustments that affected many aspects of the Mexican eco-
nomic, political and social landscapes, including, but not limited to: gen-
eralized privatization of government enterprises, a radical change in land 
ownership models and regulations, and uncontrolled city growth patterns 
that are characterized by a drastic segregation between incomes.2 
While the free-trade model achieved a more transparent, efficient form 
of governance, there are serious consequences derived from its adoption 
that need further exploration. Today, most Mexican cities suffer from a se-
ries of urban problems that might have been exacerbated by the adoption 
of neoliberal policies. Gated communities that reflect deep socioeconomic 
disparities, and informal settlements that remain a persistent urban feature 
1 Alexander, William and Weaver, Thomas (2012). Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico. 
University Press of Colorado. p. 2
2 García Peralta, Beatriz and Hofer, Andreas (2006). Housing for the Working Class on the Periphery of 
Mexico City: A New Version of Gated Communities. Social Justice: 3 (150). pp. 129-41
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in the vast majority of Mexican cities, are common issues that might have, 
at least in part, resulted from the deregulation of land tenure, a shift that es-
sentially transformed land into a commodity, by intensifying its transaction 
value, and minimizing its use value.
With this thesis, I explore this relationship. Essentially, I am interested in 
the ties between the evolution and sudden shifts in broader political econ-
omy in Mexico, and the physical transformation of cities in Mexico. I study 
the land use changes throughout the last two decades, following the most 
aggressive rollout of neoliberal reforms in Mexican history, and I have cho-
sen the city of Querétaro, a typical case of uneven urban expansion. 
Methodologically, I delve on the origins –causes- of a broad policy imple-
mentation and, relying on historical land use data, as well as municipal doc-
umentation and Federal census data, I study the effects that land use dereg-
ulation has had on the urban form of the city. More specifically, I explore the 
notion that land use changes, from protected agricultural or environmental 
reserves to urban uses -residential, commercial, and industrial, among oth-
ers-, might contribute to the proliferation of both informal settlements and 
formal subdivisions at the fringes of the city, where these land use changes 
are occurring. In other words, I explore the notion that neoliberal regulation 
of land has had a direct consequence on the shape of the city by causing 
sprawling patterns, especially for housing developments.
Great part of the motivation of this study comes from a study conducted 
by Harner, et al (2009), in which they argue that global practices that pro-
mote the outright implementation of neoliberal reforms, have very tangi-
ble, local effects in local policies that shape the urban form. Reforms that 
followed the adoption of the neoliberal ideology, they argue, have greatly 
affected the production of space in urban Mexico, as they have liberalized 
access to credit for housing, clearly promoting and enhancing a platform to 
favor private property, and promoting private land development.3 Howev-
er, favoring private property has turned housing into a private investment, 
rather than a more general social good, by enhancing its transaction value 
over its use value. This notion essentially excludes all those workers outside 
3 Harner, John, Jiménez Huerta, Edith and Cruz Solis, Heriberto (2009). Buying Development: Housing 
and Urban Growth in Guadalajara, México. Urban Geography 30(5):465-89: 471
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of the formal economy.  
Ultimately, the purpose of this study is to explore, and possibly confirm, 
the preliminary hypothesis that the introduction of drastic deregulatory 
reforms has had unexpected, negative consequences in the way in which 
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There have been numerous scholarly works exploring the nexus between 
neoliberal reforms and urban patterns, both in the international and Mex-
ican contexts. I find it necessary, however, to define this key concept be-
fore moving forward. Neoliberalism is a theory of political economy that 
suggests that the best way to advance human well-being is liberating indi-
vidual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills. This theory proposes to liberate 
these freedoms within a specific institutional framework that favors private 
property rights, a free market, and free trade. The state, according to neolib-
eralism, should limit its intervention to create and preserve the institutional 
framework in which these practices can be successful.4 However, as neolib-
eralism caught on in different economies around the world, it became very 
apparent that its principles were –and still are- being used to justify, among 
other major shifts, the deregulation over private industry, the privatization 
of state-owned corporation, the outright frontal attack on organized labor, 
the reduction of corporate taxes, the shrinking and sometimes privatization 
of public services, and the dismantling of welfare programs.5
 Moving on, I have identified a convergence of three broader topics to be 
relevant for this research:
1) The evolution of Mexican economic policy, from the creation of the 
modern Mexican State in the first decades of the XX century, to the even-
tual implementation of the neoliberal economic model. I find it necessary 
to weave this historical perspective into my research because the decisions, 
strategies and events that transpired throughout Mexico’s past became the 
detonators of the neoliberal implementation. Essentially, if I want to under-
stand the present economy, political decisions, and the collective idiosyn-
crasies in Mexico, I need to understand the past.  
2) The nuances, patterns and evolution of land tenure and housing 
policies in the modern Mexican State. This evolution, in line with the previ-
ous reasoning, is relevant for this research because clear up why the direc-
tion and strategy in terms of broader economic policy have such profound 
impacts in the way space is produced in Mexico. 
3) The city of Querétaro, a case study, in terms of historical develop-
4 Harvey, David (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press: p. 2.
5 Bremmer, Neil and Theodore, Nik (2002). Cities and Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’. 
Antipode, 34(3), p. 348-78.
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ment and current urban issues. My research is based upon the study of land 
use in this city. As such, I find it fundamental to briefly but thoroughly ex-
plore the historical development of the city, as well as the infrastructural 
and institutional frameworks that have facilitated the city’s transformation. 
All three of these themes will be explored on this section.
14
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2.1
The Invisible Hand: Evolution 
of Economic Policy in Mexico
Mexico’s economic history is extremely complex. An in-depth, compre-
hensive analysis of such would require an entirely independent dissertation 
and years of research. Its relevance for this thesis lies in the fact that the only 
way to understand why the neoliberal model was adopted, it is necessary to 
understand the series of decisions and most important events that led to it. 
This is an account that will be condensed in the following section.
After years of violent war, political unrest and economic stagnation, what 
can be considered the beginning of the modern Mexican state was born 
with the drafting of the Mexican Constitution in 1917, and the eventual 
formation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional, PRI), in 1929. The PRI ruled until the year 2000, when it was 
democratically ousted with the election of Vicente Fox, the first president to 
emerge from an opposing party in over 70 years.
Over its stay in power, the PRI managed to create a corporatist state that 
was skilled at controlling and organizing workers, peasants and the middle 
classes, the very basis of the revolution that led to its creation. By tightly 
controlling social liberties, buying off adversaries and even blatantly sup-
pressing oppositional movements, the party pursued a state-led modern-
ization and economic development model mainly focused, at least during 
its first decades, on import substitution and vigorous export trade with the 
US.6
Throughout the 71 years of the PRI’s permanence in power, we can iden-
6 Harvey, 2006
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tify five7  key moments that shaped Mexico’s economic and political direc-
tion, as follows.
1. The Period of Reconstruction (1917- 1940)
At the time of the state-party formation, more than 70 percent of the 
economically active population worked in the primary sector, and only 15 
percent were involved in an industrial activity. Mexico was a primarily rural 
economy, with most infrastructure and key economic drivers, such as rail-
roads, oil, electricity, telephones and mining still controlled by foreign cap-
ital.8 At the same time, the state-party was being formed in the midst of an 
acute international economic depression (1929-1932),9 in which Mexico’s 
revenues fell by over 25 percent. However, by 1933, the effects of the eco-
nomic depression had somewhat subsided, and public spending regained 
strength. The finance sector also significantly expanded and formalized 
during the 1930´s. However, the most important years of the reconstruc-
tion period happened with the tenure of President Lázaro Cárdenas, who 
was in power between 1934 and 1940. During his tenure, Cárdenas paid 
special attention to the Agrarian Reform -established in the 1917 Consti-
tution as the political climax of the Mexican Revolution-, and large amount 
of land and agricultural properties were distributed among peasants and 
field laborers10 (this topic, fundamental for this thesis, will be explored in 
more detail in a subsequent section). Cárdenas also created a large amount 
of public enterprises, and prioritized spending as a vehicle for economic 
development, as during this six-year period important infrastructure proj-
ects were developed in the agriculture sector, a top priority in Cárdenas’ 
agenda for economic development. In fact, by the end of Cárdenas’ tenure, 
the investment on agriculture represented almost 30 percent of the public 
investment budget.11
 In addition to placing agricultural development as one of his great-
7 Gollás, Manuel, (2003). México. Crecimiento con Desigualdad y Pobreza: De la sustitución de import-
aciones a los tratados de libre comercio con quien se deje. Serie de Documentos de  Trabajo, Número 3. Centro 
de Estudios Económcos. El Colegio de México
8 MacLeod, Dag (2004). Downsizing the State: Privatization and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform in 
Mexico. The Pennsylvania State University Press.
9 Gollás, 2003
10 Lomelí Venegas, Leonardo (2012). Interpretaciones sobre el desarrollo económico de México en el 
siglo XX. Economía UNAM. 9(27). P. 91-108.
11 Gollás, 2003
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est priorities, Cárdenas managed to consolidate the Revolution’s nationalis-
tic and popular sentiments, also central to his party’s rhetoric, 
through pacts with various popular organizations, chief among them the peasants’ confeder-
ation (Confederación Nacional Campesina, or CNC) and the workers’ central trade union (Con-
federación de Trabajadores de México, or CTM). Through these acts the government traded 
protection for the social interests represented by these organizations in exchange for political 
support.12 
With the support of the major worker unions, Cárdenas ensured both a 
long-standing peace and a firm control of most social, economic and po-
litical spheres by the Federal government, and thus the powerful PRI. The 
corporatist structure of the regime was consolidated. 
However, the most transcendental policy undertaken under the Cárdenas 
administration, one which has had major political implications until pres-
ent days, was the nationalization of the petroleum industry on March 18, 
1938. Appealing to the symbolic importance of petroleum nationalization 
as a need to free Mexico from foreign economic influence,13 the Cárdenas 
administration pursued national control of the precious resource as an im-
portant source of foreign exchange that Mexico would need to push its in-
dustrial development.14 
2. The Period of Import Substitution and “Inward Oriented” 
Growth (1940-1954)
Following the Cárdenas period, the most important objectives of Pres-
idents Manuel Ávila Camacho, Miguel Alemán and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, 
at least in terms of economic policy, were directed to the construction of 
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, like roads and rail-
roads, and the efficient production of electricity and hydrocarbon products 
that ensured cheap, subsidized inputs for the private industry. The period’s 
political economy was directed towards stimulating private investments 
with the purpose of creating and strengthening an industrial and commer-
12 Bazdresch, Carlos and Levy, Santiago (1991) Populism and Economic Policy in Mexico, 1970-1982, pp. 
223-262 in Dornbusch, Rudiger and Edwards, Sebastian, eds. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. 
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cial agriculture economic base.15
This period was also marked by an increased demand for Mexican raw 
materials caused by World War II, but also by a shift towards import substi-
tution to satisfy national demands. This shift was encouraged by the radical 
drop in production in industrialized countries, especially the United States, 
which traditionally supplied industrial goods.16
3) The Period of “Stabilizing Development” (1954-1970)
In 1954, during the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, the Mexican peso 
was devalued against the American dollar, stabilizing exchange rates, and 
allowing for high economic development, a stability of commodity prices17 
and very low inflation in the following two decades. During this period, 
which happened in an international environment that was highly condu-
cive for growth, growth was centered on industrial production, causing the 
gradual decline of the agricultural sector that was vigorously pushed by 
previous administrations. 
The Stabilizing Development period revolved around a control on in-
flation, a fundamental ingredient of the stability of exchange rates, and 
achieved by extremely tight control of public finances. In addition, tax poli-
cy was used to promote private investment and subsidize key sectors of the 
economy, such as energy, food and transportation.18
 Industrial growth happened, furthermore, under a very rigid protec-
tionist system for national industrialists, characterized by high import tariffs, 
permits and quotas against foreign competition, and a system of countless 
public firms that provided subsidized electricity and petroleum, while still 
providing valuable revenues to allow the Federal government to maintain 
a very low tax rate.19 In exchange, the private sector agreed to leave all mat-
ters of economic and social policies, and all other key activities for national 
15 Gollás, 2003
16 Lomelí Venegas, 2012
17 Tello, Carlos (2010). Notas sobre el Desarrollo Estabilizador. Economía Informa, Num. 364. Julio-Septi-
embre, 2010 and Lomelí Venegas, 2012
18 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
19 MacLeod, 2004
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development, in the hands of the Federal government.20 
Even though economic growth was sustained, by the end of the 1960’s 
major governance flaws started to become apparent. Uneven concentra-
tion of wealth, lagging social services associated with reduced public ex-
penditure; agricultural insufficiency associated with an obvious urban bias 
in the period’s economic policy; industrial inefficiency and the emergence 
of oligopolistic industrial structures - an alternate consequence of the strict 
protectionist policies-; a debilitating public sector and an extremely insuf-
ficient democratic practice, were also key characteristics of this period.21 
These flaws were also contributors to the political crisis that exploded at 
the end of the 1960’s, epitomized by the violent suppression of the Student 
Movement of 1968. The brutal killings of hundreds of organized students 
protesting social inequalities on October 2, 1968 both radically unbalanced 
the PRI’s political legitimacy22, and made it clear that the regime’s approach 
towards economic and social policy was in urgent need of reform.23
4) The Crisis Presidential Terms: Echeverría and López Portillo 
(1970-1982)
 Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) took office during a sizeable political cri-
sis, one which he made it his top priority as he settled into the presidency, 
and the country’s approach to economic policy, traditionally cautious, was 
considerably modified. Echeverría promised political reform, in which he 
signaled a stronger government intervention in the economy in order to 
reduce poverty, increase investment in areas where the public enterprise 
was lagging, and reduce the importance of foreign firms.24
For Echeverría, low inflation and nominal exchange rate stability, both in-
herited from the period of sustained growth, were important targets, which 
he combined with the promise of increasing social spending and employ-
ment.25 
20 Tello, 2010
21 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991 and Tello, 2010
22 Harvey, 2005
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However, international economic conditions challenged Echevería’s re-
gime even further, as the global crisis that was sparked by the OPEC (Orga-
nization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo hit Mexico badly by 
increasing domestic inflationary pressures.26 The Federal government, fear-
ful of further social unrest, responded by significantly extending the public 
sector by taking over failing private enterprises and maintaining them as 
sources of employment.27 However, this increase in public spending hap-
pened in the absence of a significant tax reform. Interestingly, in 1972, the 
Echeverría administration seriously considered a fiscal reform that would 
increase taxes, an initiative that received a very negative response from the 
private sector, with capital flight threats, which would have a negative ef-
fect, in turn, on the constant nominal exchange rates that Echeverría was 
fixated on maintaining.28
As public spending increased, public finances rapidly deteriorated. As a 
result, the state had to borrow to fund its expansion. During this time, as 
the oil crisis developed, the international capital markets and investment 
banks, full with petrodollars, were eager to invest in new markets. Mexico, 
in turn, had recently made important oil discoveries, making the country 
a very attractive option for investment. As a result, foreign debt increased, 
from $6.8 billion in 1972 to $58 billion in 1982.29
To make matters worse, the instability of Echeverría’s economic stance 
began to show negative results. Inflation rates started to grow uncontrol-
lably, going from 5 percent in 1972 to 23.8 percent in 1974.30 At the same 
time, growing budget deficits and devaluation expectations slowed private 
investment, and in fact, caused significant capital flight. This caused a vi-
cious circle in which the government responded by calling for a larger role 
in the economy and stepping up public investment, further deteriorating 
its finances and public borrowing.31 At this point, it was clear that the fixed 
exchange rate, maintained since 1954, was obviously overvalued.
The vicious circle in which the country was immersed in finally led to a 
26 ibid.
27 Harvey, 2005
28 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
29 Harvey, 2005
30 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
31 ibid.
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much overdue conclusion: in September 1976, with only a few months left 
in his administration, Echeverría finally devalued the fixed exchange rate by 
59 percent,32 and entered in an austerity agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).33 
Needless to say, José López Portillo (1976-1982) took office in turbulence. 
As part of the IMF negotiations, public spending and real money supply 
were reduced by 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively. Changes in trade 
policy were also agreed: imports, all of which were subject to permits by 
the end of 1976, were to be deregulated.34 Other reforms included a change 
in tax policy, in which added tax replaced a complicated cascading system 
of indirect taxes. Corporate and personal income taxes were also reformed. 
After the recent discovery of oil reserves, the Federal government em-
barked in great efforts to increase revenues from the sale of the precious 
commodity; this only stimulated an increase in public spending and aggra-
vating the already critical fiscal deficit.35 On this matter, Bazdresch and Levy 
speculate:
Perhaps if oil had not been discovered the Mexican economy might have returned to the macro 
policies of stabilizing development, but with the added lesson that the structural reforms of tax-
ation, trade and regional policy could be postponed no longer. Oil, however, was discovered; it 
changed all. With the benefit of hindsight we can see the unfortunate event: a temporary terms 
of trade improvement in a commodity that had recently been discovered to be in abundant 
supply turned the government’s attention away from structural reforms.36
The López Portillo administration was also characterized by a poor perfor-
mance in non-petroleum exports. At the same time, slow domestic growth 
caused an increased demand for import goods, which resulted in an im-
portant commercial deficit. In consequence, the country became increas-
ingly dependent on petroleum: by 1981, oil represented 73 percent of total 
exports.37 At this point in time, furthermore, exchange rates had become 
sensitive to fluctuations in oil prices, and when a second oil shock occurred 
32 ibid.
33 MacLeod, 2004
34 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
35 Gollás, 2003
36 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991: p. 247
37 Gollás, 2003
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in 1979, the sense of euphoria that followed undermined fiscal discipline38 : 
cheap oil prices meant a further increase in the country’s fiscal deficit. 
As oil prices continued to fall, numerous private companies that had their 
debts tied to an overvalued exchange rate went bankrupt, stimulating a 
massive capital flight. In response, the Federal government responded by 
fixing the exchange rate.39 . López Portillo saw devaluation and stabilization 
as an utter surrender to the State’s enemies, as these two measures implied 
major adjustments to the government’s economic policy.40 López Portillo 
would not back down:
Let us defend our peso! That is the structure that is best for the country… That is the structure 
that I have pledged to defend like a dog!41
By 1982, oil prices kept falling, and the government’s relationship with 
the private sector had completely soured. At the same time, foreign suppli-
ers had begun to realize the magnitude of Mexico’s outstanding obligations 
and deteriorated economic conditions, essentially stopping the flow of ex-
ternal resources.42 The federal reserves almost completely dried out, leav-
ing no room to maneuver, causing the reluctant increase of some public 
sector prices. National bankruptcy was formally declared in August, 1982, 
followed by a massive nominal devaluation of 470 percent.43
However, as a shocking conclusion to the López Portillo presidency, the 
President announced the expropriation of the banking system on Septem-
ber 1, 1982 during his annual presidential address, three months before 
leaving office, in a desperate effort to curb capital flight and to harness pri-
vate interests to national development goals.44 López Portillo´s presidency 
ended in a very similar way as the previous one: with the signing of a stabi-
lization program with the International Monetary Fund.45 
38 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
39 Gollás, 2003
40 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
41 Portion of a speech delivered by José López Portillo on August 17, 1981. Translation by author.
42 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
43 ibid.
44 MacLeod, 2004
45 Bazdresch and Levy, 1991
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5) The Period of Structural Reforms and Trade Liberalization
 Following tradition, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) began his pres-
idential term amid a national crisis. As he assumed power, he sided with the 
private businesses and foreign interests that were pushing for an aggres-
sive economic reform agenda: essentially, to revise the role of the State in 
the national economy, and Mexico’s relationship with the global economy.46 
The bottom line is that De la Madrid was much less absorbed in the tradi-
tional politics of his party. He also had very close relations with the capitalist 
class, and with private foreign interests. As a result, when the International 
Monetary Fund, the United States Treasury, and the World Bank combined 
efforts to come up with a package to bail out Mexico out of outright bank-
ruptcy, insisting for the first time in a full implementation of neoliberal re-
forms, De la Madrid gave in to their pressures.47
According to the previously mentioned international finance institutions 
(IMF, World Bank), prominent champions of the neoliberal ideas, Mexico 
suffered from excessive interventionism, which had resulted in an excessive 
growth of the state machinery, excessive bureaucratization, and excessive 
spending, all aggravated by the impending corruption, inefficiency and the 
government elite’s wasteful patterns. As such, a ‘thinning of the state’ was 
an urgent matter,48 so they pressured De la Madrid on specific reforms that 
had to do with privatization of failing state enterprises, the abandonment 
of protectionism that had created an expensive and inefficient industry,49 , a 
reorganization of the financial system in ways more consistent with foreign 
interests, the opening of international markets to foreign capital, lowering 
tariff barriers, and the construction of more flexible labor markets.50
As a result, as soon as De la Madrid took office in December, 1982, he 
launched the Immediate Program of Economic Reorganization  (Programa 
Inmediato de Reorganización Económica, PIRE), with which he intended 
to reduce the public treasury’s deficit by embarking on public spending 
cuts; to curb inflation, and to revive historical growth rates in the Mexican 
46 Lomelí Venegas, 2012
47 Harvey, 2005
48 Revueltas, Andrea (1993). Las reformas del Estado en México: del Estado benefactor al Estado neolib-
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economy.51 WIth the PIRE, De la Madrid formalized the aggressive change 
of course towards the neoliberal model52 that the IMF pushed at the end of 
De la Madrid’s predecessor’s tenure.
As the economic crisis endured, De la Madrid implemented an aggressive 
austerity program, in which he reduced public spending from 4.4 percent 
to 2.5 percent of GDP.53 At the same time, expenditures on critical urban 
services were also cut, including transport, potable water, health services, 
trash collection and public education. Food subsidies were restricted to the 
poorest sectors.54 Worst of all, Mexico’s outstanding debts were not being 
reduced as was originally planned. De la Madrid concluded that the sale 
of public enterprises would become a key strategy to significantly reduce 
debt, reform public finances, and regain the trust of the alienated private 
sector.55
In 1988, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) succeeded Miguel De la 
Madrid as president. During his tenure, Salinas accelerated and formalized 
the process of privatization started by his predecessor. It was also during Sa-
linas’ tenure that Mexico’s economy completed its transformation to neolib-
eral orthodoxy56: he further expanded the role of foreign investment in the 
domestic economy, and further diminished the power of organized labor. 
The latter as a key action if he was to successfully dismantle Mexican public 
enterprise. Public Employment was cut in half in the six years of Salinas’ ten-
ure, and the number of public firms was reduced to barely over 200 in 2000 
from the more than 1,100 at the beginning of De la Madrid’s presidency in 
198257.  Inflation was significantly reduced, going from 52 percent at the 
beginning of his administration, to 8 percent in 1993,58 and with a flexible 
economy, exchange rates were reevaluated and lowered. Most important-
ly, however, was the fact that Salinas began, and successfully completed, 
the negotiations with the United States to create the North American Free 
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private sector on both the State and the national economy.59
As part of the Free Trade Agreement, the banks, which had been reluc-
tantly expropriated at the end of López Portillo’s tenure in 1982, were re-pri-
vatized in 1990; NAFTA required that he open up the agricultural industry 
to foreign competition, acting against one of the most important pillars of 
the PRI’s structure: the peasantry. This reform is of specific importance for 
this thesis, since it fundamentally changed land tenure regulations that had 
been in place for almost eighty years, which will be detailed in a subsequent 
section of this thesis. 
 During Salinas’ tenure, macroeconomic variables followed an exem-
plary evolution, as he was able to reduce inflation from 160 percent in 1987 
to 8 percent in 1993, for example, and the peso appreciated against CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) around 30 percent in the first 4 years of his tenure.60
However, on par with these apparent successes in macroeconomic vari-
ables, Mexico maintained an accelerated fiscal deficit, reaching a maximum 
of 7.7 percent over GDP in 1994. This deficit, which was financed through 
the boost of foreign capital influx as the economy was opened to foreign 
investment, was directly related to two phenomena61:
 1) The fact that the national currency had been gaining strength all 
throughout Salinas’ tenure
2) Private sector savings were also on a fiscal deficit, reflecting an ex-
cess of investment in respect to real savings of private actors.
The influx of foreign capital, while boosting macroeconomic figures, also 
made the country financially vulnerable and dependent on foreign funds: 
between 1991 and 1994, Treasury Bond financing increased from 19 billion 
to 25 billion dollars.62
On February, 1994, the United States FederalReserve rose interest rates, 
from 3 percent to 3.25 percent, and continued to rise rates for a total of six 
59 ibid.
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times this years: from 3 percent in January, to 5.6 percent in December of 
that year. At the same time, on March 23, 1994, the presidential candidate 
that was running for the PRI, to essentially take over after Salinas, was assas-
sinated in a campaign rally in northern Mexico, signaling political instability. 
These two events, combined, caused a massive capital flight from the Mex-
ican financial system. 
The resulting reaction by the Salinas’ team was incredibly risky: they as-
sumed that this sudden shift in foreign capital flow was temporary, as it 
was following a transitory political uncertainty that would be promptly re-
solved. Obviously, they were wrong. Even after the elections in August, in 
which the PRI candidate resulted victorious, foreign capital continued to 
leave the country. As capital fled, the Mexican Treasury kept issuing an in-
credibly high amount of Treasury Bonds, a financial instrument to which the 
Salinas administration became completely dependent on. To make matters 
worse, an overvalued peso was maintained, signaling a lack of strictness in 
the Mexican exchange system to the international investors. 
Finally, on December 20, 1994, as a desperate measure, the Salinas ad-
ministration devalued the peso 15 percent. As it was too late, capital flight 
did not subside. In fact, it reached a critical point: in the following two days 
after the measure was enacted, more than 4 billion dollars of foreign invest-
ment left the country,63 all in a hurry, as the international financial markets 
lost all faith in the Mexican economy. Furthermore, between December 20 
and December 22, Mexican private investors recalled more than 4 and a 
half billion dollars. Between November, 1994, and February, 1995, foreign 
investment in the Mexican Stock Market went from around 50 billion dol-
lars, to 18 billion dollars, causing a radical drop in stock prices as well. But, 
most critically, Treasury Bonds that would expire during the first months 
of 1995 held a value of almost 10 billion dollars. Exchange reserves, at the 
end of December, had fallen by almost 6 and a half billion dollars, and panic 
that the Mexican Treasury would not be able to pay its obligations, ensued. 
As a result, investment on Treasury Bonds by foreign investors came to an 
almost complete stop, dropping from almost 18 billion dollars at the end of 
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As a bittersweet end to Salinas’ tenure, the “Miracle Years” in Mexican eco-
nomic policy, after masterfully bringing the biggest economic transforma-
tion in Mexican history into full fruition, Mexico suffered the worst econom-
ic crisis in the country’s existence.65
In this section, I explored the key moments in recent Mexican economic 
history that led to the eventual adoption of a neoliberal economic mod-
el, crowned with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Due to the scope of this thesis I exclusively focused on the realm of broad 
economic policy but, as I explained at the beginning of this chapter, it is also 
necessary to explore another critical perspective in order to fully construct a 
theoretical background for this thesis: How did land and housing manage-
ment evolve throughout the studied period? And, more importantly, how 
were land and housing tenure modified by the structural transformations 
that occurred in Mexican economy during the 1980’s and 1990’s?
65 Gollás, 2003
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2.2
Land, Housing and the Free 
Market
When the new Constitution was drafted at the end of the Mexican Revo-
lutionary War in 1917, the document included a fundamental component 
that empowered the agrarian class, thus providing the PRI with the perfect 
tool to establish itself as the guardian of the Revolution66: Article 27, which 
dealt with land tenure, and Article 123, which dealt with work and social 
prevision.  
Among other provisions, Article 27 stated:
… the necessary measures will be enacted for the subdivision of large estates; for the develop-
ment of smallholdings; for the creation of new agricultural population centers with the lands 
and waters indispensable to them; for the promotion of agriculture and to avoid the destruction 
of natural elements and the damages that property might suffer to the detriment of society. The 
villages, settlements and communities that lack lands and waters, or that do not have them in 
sufficient quantity for the needs of their population, shall be entitled to them, taking them from 
adjacent properties, always respecting smallholdings.67
In terms of ownership, Article 27 also stated:
All proceedings, dispositions, resolutions and demarcation, concession, composition, sentence, 
transaction, sale or auction operations that would have totally or partially deprived co-own-
erships, settlements, villages, congregations, tribes and other population corporations of their 
lands, forests and waters, which may still exist since the Law of the 25th of June of 1856, are 
declared void; and similarly, all dispositions, resolutions and operations taking place hereinafter 
and producing the same effects, are declared void. In consequence, all lands, forests and waters 
66 Jones, Gareth and Ward, Peter (1998). “Privatizing the Commons: Reforming the Ejido and Urban 
Development in Mexico.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(1):. 76-93.
67 Mexico (1917). Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, que reforma la de 5 de Febrero 
de 1857. Diario Oficial, Tomo V, 4a Época, No. 30: 149-161. Translation by Author.
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from which the referred corporations have been deprived, will be restored…68
As seen above, Article 27 introduced a quintessential form of land owner-
ship, communal in nature, commonly referred to as the ejido. This form of 
ownership, which stemmed from the demands of the Revolution, protected 
the legal rights of indigenous and peasant populations, or ejidatarios, allow-
ing them to collectively use land,69 while locking-in the agrarian purposes 
of the land by prohibiting the sale, rent or mortgage of these properties.70
Since the beginning of the modern Mexican State, the task of providing 
decent housing for the masses has been an almost impossible task. In seek-
ing a solution for this problem, the state has since then attempted to tie so-
cial housing provision to the close relationship between the working class 
and their employers.71 In fact, the 1917 Constitution made it mandatory, 
through Article 123, for employers to provide dignified housing for their 
employees:
In every agricultural, industrial, mining or any other kind of work, employers will be obligated to 
provide for workers, comfortable and hygienic habitations, for which they may charge rents that 
will not exceed half a percent a month of the cadastral value of the plots.72
However, these dispositions would take decades to be seriously imple-
mented. Even so, during the first decades of the PRI regime, the Federal 
government was able to provide loans to public sector workers. It was also 
able to invest in social housing, by developing and leasing units.73
The rapid urbanization that naturally followed the fast process of indus-
trialization that was pushed during the Import Substitution period (1940-
1954), made the need for land and housing apparent to the Federal gov-
ernment. The regime, however, centered its attention on the bureaucratic 
sector, an important base for political support.74 By the early 1960’s, the 
68 ibid.
69 Harvey, 2005
70 Jones and Ward, 1998
71 Garcia Peralta and Hofer, 2006
72 Mexico, 1917, Translation by Author
73 Velázquez Leyer, Ricardo (2015). The Development of Housing in Mexico: A Welfare Regime Ap-
proach. Social Policy and Society, 14(4): 523-39.
74 García Peralta, Beatriz (2010). Vivienda Social en México (1940-1999): Actores públicos, económicos y 
sociales. Cuadernos de Vivienda y Urbanismo. 3(5): 34-49
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social housing programs that were adopted during the first decades of the 
PRI regime were abandoned, mainly because public policy shifted towards 
the promotion of private property, as a way to combat perceived as socialist 
pressures.75 In addition, during the 1960’s decade, the housing stock signifi-
cantly increased 18 percent from 1960 to 1970. In this same period, how-
ever, population in Mexico increased by more than 38 percent, going from 
34.9 million in 1960 to 48.2 million in 1970. Less than one percent of this 
housing stock increase happened with any kind of support from the state,76 
and it was still insufficient to keep up with population growth.
In 1963, the Federal government created a centralized public fund called 
the Housing Banking Finance and Operation Fund (Fondo de Operación y 
Descuento Bancario a la Vivienda, FOVI), an institution in charge of chan-
neling resources through private banks for the construction and acquisition 
of housing units, marking the beginning of large-scale housing production 
for social purposes. It worked as a combination of public and private cap-
ital that was collected by obligatory fees charged to private banking insti-
tutions,77 and that spurred the emergence of the first large-scale housing 
development private corporations.78 FOVI, however, was limited to those 
families with middle and upper incomes, since these kinds of private loans 
were not affordable for poorer families79 that were left with the only option 
of self-built housing in irregular settlements.
As I explained in the previous section, the 1970’s decade was characteris-
tically turbulent, both economically and socially, which directly translated 
into a political legitimacy crisis, with social movements demanding more 
public spending to improve basic services, and a private sector that was 
adamant to invest in a fragile economy. This included, of course, a complete 
disinterest in social housing development.80 As a response, the Federal gov-
ernment under the tenure of Luis Echeverría, created the National Workers’ 
Housing Fund Institute (Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los 
Trabajadores, INFONAVIT) and the Housing Fund of the State Workers’ So-
cial Security and Services Institute (Fondo de de la Vivienda del Instituto de 
75 Velazquez Leyer, 2015
76 García Peralta, 2010
77 ibid.
78 García Peralta, and Hofer, 2006
79 Velázquez Leyer, 2015
80 García Peralta, 2010
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Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado, FOVISSSTE) in 
1972. This action represented the first time ever in which the constitutional 
duty of directly financing working-class housing was complied with.81 This 
was achieved through formal employers, which were required to place five 
percent over all workers’ salaries on a common fund that would be used to 
subsidize the purchasing, construction or upgrading of housing units. It was 
conceived with the huge advantage of shifting money from higher-paid 
workers to those with higher housing needs.82 The Institute was conceived 
as a coordinator and planner of housing developments, leaving the con-
struction process to sub-contracted private companies (Velázquez, 2015), 
and one of its main conception flaws is that it is limited to waged workers 
in the formal economy, completely excluding all those groups outside of it, 
like the informal sector workers, peasants and all those self-employed. 
It is important to note that 
Unlike social housing in Europe, Mexican social housing is not for rent. Social housing means rel-
atively affordable housing with assistance and regulations for giving loans to people who would 
not otherwise be able to finance the buying of a house on the free market.83
Even though the program was a great success in radically expanding the 
number of loans granted for social-interest housing, the process was still 
conducted “with high levels of clientelism, corruption and inequality [as] 
access to government programmes depended to a large extent on corpo-
ratist/clientelistic arrangements developed to guarantee social and politi-
cal control.”84
The major economic policy shifts that began in 1982 had a major impact 
on every strategic area of policy and governance, including housing. Fol-
lowing the trend of reform in all these strategic areas, the two major hous-
ing financing institutions, INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE, experienced radical 
reforms in 1992. 
In order to increase transparency in the allocation of loans and fund ad-
81 García Peralta and Hofer, 2006
82 ibid.
83 García Peralta and Hofer, 2006: 131
84 Velázquez Leyer, 2015: p. 516
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ministration, an individual account was opened for every worker, accen-
tuating individual contributions and benefits over the collective. This way, 
the financing institutions would be able to keep track of each individual’s 
contributions. At the same time, INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE were required 
to pay return rates higher than the annual increase of the minimum wage. 
With these individual savings accounts, workers would be able to use their 
balance as down payments to buy a home. Both financing institutions also 
walked away from subcontracting firms to build housing developments, 
and they were transformed into purely financing institutions.85 The adop-
tion of the housing reforms fundamentally changed the role of the state as 
a provider of housing into a mere facilitator with no further responsibility in 
terms of planning or production; one that simply sets the right conditions 
for private investment to function and thrive. It essentially repositioned “citi-
zens from public, collective, social subjects to individual, economic subjects 
- a change from citizen to consumer.”86 These reforms, however, neglected 
the needs of the poorest workers, as they privileged middle and upper in-
come workers, because they essentially set individual account balances and 
wages as the criteria to establish loan eligibility.87
Another major reform that radically affected the production of housing, 
while provoking an extremely disorganized growth of urban areas88 took 
place in the first few years of the 1990s decade, when President Carlos Sali-
nas de Gortari completely reformed the ejido system, which was detailed at 
the beginning of this section. President Salinas de Gortari, in line with the 
international financial institutions’ pressures to open up the Mexican econ-
omy, established a completely new Agrarian Law, in which the collective 
use rights of the ejidos were converted into individual rights to sell, rent or 
mortgage otherwise communal land to other, non-ejido members of the 
community. It also allowed for setting up joint venture contracts with pri-
vate companies, both domestic and foreign.89
The Agrarian reform did not happen without major opposition. Since the 
ejido regime was the basis of collective security among indigenous and 
other peasant groups, the Federal government was essentially washing its 
85 Velázquez Leyer, 2015
86 Harner, et al, 2009: P. 468
87 Velázquez Leyer, 2015
88 ibid.
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hands from the responsibilities to maintain said security. Furthermore, the 
Free Trade Agreement included lowering import barriers, a fact that de-
livered another blow to the peasant communities, as cheap imports from 
the United States, with a substantially more efficient and highly-subsidized 
agribusiness, lowered the price of corn and other basic products to the crit-
ical point where only the most efficient and affluent Mexican producers 
could compete. The rest, were forced off the land, increasing the pool of 
unemployed and causing a significant growth in the informal sectors of the 
economy.90 
Additionally, popular opposition to the Agrarian Reform became notori-
ous all around the world on January 1, 1994, when a peasant rebellion in the 
southern state of Chiapas, led by the EZLN (National Zapatista Liberation 
Army), questioned the so-called successful implementation of the neoliber-
al reforms. Their main outcry was, as it was mentioned, that foreign imports 
of grain under NAFTA would dramatically undermine agrarian communi-
ties.91
At the time of the reform, there were almost thirty thousand ejidos in 
Mexico, representing over 55 percent of the total national land area.92 Most 
of the nation’s metropolitan cities were, and still are, surrounded by what 
used to be land in this type of tenure. 
At this point in time, the two major housing financing institutions, which 
had previously determined the location, architecture, price and target 
groups of its investments, were being turned into a purely financial, qua-
si-public institutions, leaving the assignment of all the previous criteria to 
exclusively private agents with high return expectations. Because most po-
tential buyers have limited resources, they were -and still are- very sensitive 
to price, so only large-scale developments on cheap land were able to fulfill 
developer return expectations.93
Thus, the Agrarian Reform fit perfectly into the wider economic trans-
formation, as it made a large amount of land, immediately adjacent to 
90 Harvey, 2005
91 Macleod, 2004
92 Velázquez Leyer, 2015
93 García Peralta, 2006
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cities, suddenly available for purchase, trading and developing, as private 
real estate developers could now legally buy ejidos. However, as was pre-
viously mentioned, developers could only realize their profit expectation 
by purchasing tracts of land further away from urban centers because it 
was cheaper, even if it lacked basic services like water, electricity, adequate 
roads or other means of transportation.94 As a result, between 1980 and 
2000, the urban population in Mexico doubled, but the urban footprint was 
multiplied by a factor of seven.95
The active “privatization” of the social-housing market perfectly paired 
with radical neoliberal transformations of economic policy have resulted 
in a very unbalanced production of space in urban Mexico. Housing is now 
viewed as a private investment rather than a public good. As a result, it ex-
cludes most workers that are not part of the formal economy.96 Measuring 
the number of Mexican workers that are excluded from the formal econo-
my is a challenging task, with the only objective metric available being the 
percent of the national economy that can be attributed to the informal sec-
tor. According to the national census, in 2014, more than 26 percent97 of the 
national Gross Domestic Product could be attributed to the informal sector. 
While this is not a direct translation, we could make the assumption that, at 
least, 1 in 4 active workers in Mexico do not have a formal job with formal 
benefits, including housing.
  
Furthermore, as housing funds originate from compulsory “fees” from 
every single worker in the formal economy, these policies might end up 
hurting the poorest workers, mainly because only middle-class families can 
truly benefit from the system, as these are the families that can practically 
qualify for housing loans.98
Measured in quantity terms, the housing financing institution reforms 
have been successful by significantly increasing housing supply. However, 
informal settlements persist as a permanent issue on the Mexican urban 
landscape. Informal settlements originate as a consequence to the complex 
94 Velázquez Leyer, 2015
95 ibid.
96 Harner, et. al, 2009
97 INEGI (2014). Medición de la Economía Informal, 2014 Preliminar. Año Base 2008. http://www.inegi.
org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/cn/informal/ 
98 García Peralta, 2006
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social dislocation in which Mexico is now engulfed. In Mexico, the vast ma-
jority of informal settlements are not, in fact, “squatter” settlements - those 
that result from the invasion of private or public lands in the form of squat-
ter settlements, as it occurs in other developing countries. They are, on the 
other hand, settlements that emerge after private land that cannot legally 
be sold is subdivided and sold to low-income families.99 These kinds of set-
tlements are attractive to low-income groups because of the flexibility in 
which payments for land and construction materials is handled, as it allows 
them to spread out payments for long periods of time.100
Traditionally, the Mexican Federal government has viewed informal set-
tlement regularization as a key component in the maintenance of political 
stability,101 as the PRI widely used land regularization as an effective popu-
list strategy since the 1970’s.”102
 
At this point, a historical perspective on both economic and housing pol-
icy has been detailed. A third, final perspective is needed, however, to com-
plete the background that holds this research together: an exploration of 
the historical and urban context of the city of Querétaro, which will provide 
the reader an understanding of why this city has been chosen as a case 
study.
99 Harner, et al, 2009: 469
100 ibid.
101 Varley, Ann (1994). ¿Clientelismo o tecnocracia? La lógica política de la regularización de la tierra 
urbana, 1970-1988. Revista mexicana de Sociología, 56(4): 135-164
102 Harner, et al, 2009: 470
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The research conducted on this thesis is centered on the city of Santia-
go de Querétaro, otherwise known simply as Querétaro; a city located in a 
fertile valley approximately 130 miles to the northwest of Mexico City. The 
relevance of Querétaro to the themes explored in this thesis lies on the fact 
that many historiographers and urban researchers identify a clear causal 
relationship between Querétaro’s physical expansion, social dynamics and 
physical morphology, with its industrial and economic growth.103 These 
characteristics will be explored throughout this section, starting with a re-
view of the city’s evolution. 
Shortly after Querétaro’s foundation in 1531, large amounts of silver were 
mined in Zacatecas, Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí, to the north and west 
of the new settlement, causing an increasing influx of Spanish immigrants 
to the area. By 1582, there were more than 200 Spanish-born inhabitants 
-referred to as peninsulares in the complicated caste system that was estab-
lished by the Spanish monarchy for its new world colonies -, and by 1635, 
there were more than 2,000 peninsulares living in the thriving city.104 
As nearby mining activities intensified, commerce in the city, especially 
in those industries that were natural suppliers for the mines in the northern 
provinces -which produced wool and other textiles, for example-, followed 
the same pattern of rapid growth and expansion. At the same time, pen-
insulares became powerful landowners, and agricultural activity became 
another important source of income in the region. 
103 González Gómez, Carmen Imelda (n.d.). Querétaro Metropolitano, una lectura sobre su nuevo crec-
imiento. Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro.
104 Bolis, Guillermo (1993).  Dos nuevas ciudades novo-hispanas en el siglo XVI: Querétaro y Puebla. 
Posgrado en Arquitectura, UNAM.
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During the last century of Spanish domination (XVII Century), Queréta-
ro and its surrounding region of El Bajío, a temperate plain that averages 
an altitude of 1,600 meters (5,250 feet) above sea level, had become the 
most important agricultural producer in the KIngdom of New Spain. At the 
same time, due to its strategic location along The Silver Route - a trade route 
that transported raw materials from the northern mines to the central areas 
around Mexico City, the seat of the Viceroy-, Querétaro also became an im-
portant manufacturing center.105 At the end of the colonial era, Querétaro 
was one of the main population centers in New Spain.106 After the war for 
independence -1810-1821-, Querétaro became the capital of the state that 
carries the same name. 
During the period known as El Porfiriato, which corresponds to the years 
between 1876 and 1910 when Porfirio Díaz ruled the country, Querétaro 
followed the new national model of industrial progress to boost the main-
ly agricultural economy of the region. During this time, the state’s govern-
ment introduced the telephone, the telegraph and electricity; gas lamps 
were installed throughout the city, and the existing water distribution net-
work was completely overhauled, substituting the outdated pipelines and 
repairing the colonial aqueduct. It was also during the Porfiriato years that 
the city introduced a differentiated space for vehicles and pedestrians: the 
first sidewalks were constructed.107
Another fundamental transformation that occurred during the final de-
cades of the nineteenth Century took place with the introduction of the 
railroad lines that connected Querétaro with Mexico City, El Bajío, and the 
Northern regions; and the introduction of the Urban Railroad, also called 
the Animal Traction Tram - Tranvía de Tracción Animal -, an urban transpor-
tation system that was mounted on rails but pulled by mules, that inter-
connected the most important points of the city. When the Revolution that 
overthrew Diaz’ regime ended in 1917, Querétaro lived two decades of eco-
nomic recession and practically no growth in any dimension.108 However, 
the city was already prepared to become one of the preferred locations to 
carry out Mexico’s industrialization that would begin in the mid-1930’s.
105 Arvizu García, Carlos (2005). Evolución urbana de Querétaro: 1531-2005. Tecnológico de Monterrey/
Municipio de Querétaro. 
106 Bolis, 1993
107 Arvizu García, 2005
108 ibid.
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 During World War II, in an attempt to shift production and resources to 
support the war effort, the United States Government, the most import-
ant supplier of industrial and commercial goods -such as iron, steel prod-
ucts and industrial machinery- to the process of Mexican industrialization, 
suspended exports into Mexican territory. As a result, the federal govern-
ment embarked on an intensive effort to substitute these import goods. To 
achieve this, a program that provided incentives to industry and commerce, 
in the form of attractive fiscal and administrative concessions that were col-
lectively called the Transformation Industry Promotion Act, or Ley de Fo-
mento a la Industria de la Transformación, was created. Naturally, Querétaro 
benefited from the established measures, and in the years between 1940 
and 1960, the city’s industrial base experienced a significant increase.109
At the same time, in an effort to provide a welcoming environment to in-
coming industry, basic services and transport infrastructure, including elec-
tricity, water, and roadways that effectively connected the city with both 
Mexico City and the north of the country, were improved significantly. Tech-
nical schools, professional colleges and universities were created to prepare 
the growing specialized workforce. 
In 1947, the Planning and Zoning Law of the State of Querétaro was en-
acted; with it, the first exclusively industrial zone, focused on the process 
foods and beverages sector,110 was created on the north-western limit of the 
city. It was a strategic position that made it easily accessible from the roads 
to other regions, the highway to Mexico City, and the major urban arteries. 
This was the first time that the city deliberately grouped and segregated 
the economic functions of the city from the habitation sectors, which was 
the beginning of Querétaro’s territorial fragmentation.111 As it was expect-
ed, the industrial sector expansion managed to attract large numbers of 
immigrants in a relatively short period of time112: between 1940 and 1960, 
Querétaro’s population tripled, going from 33,629 to 103,907 inhabitants.113
109 Neri Rodríguez, Digna Rocío (2013). Industrialización y Transformaciones Urbanas en Querétaro: 
Cambios y Continuidades en la Colonia Obrera, 1943-1979. Master Thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro.
110 Aragón Domínguez, María Esperanza (n.d.). La Conformación de la Zona Metropolitana de Querétaro. 
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.
111 González Gómez, n.d.
112 Arvizu García, 2005
113 INEGI - Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística (1940-2010). Censos y Conteos de Población y 
Vivienda 1940-2010. <http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/ccpv/>.
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It was at the decade of the 1960’s when the city finally started to over-
crowd the compact urban form that had been more or less maintained in 
terms of size since the Spanish Colony, a spatial organization in which all 
activities revolved around a single urban core, without any clear differentia-
tion between sectors, socioeconomic groups, or ethnicities.114
During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, production shifted from tra-
ditional manufacturing of diverse basic goods into more specialized con-
sumption goods like auto parts, electronic devices and machinery. As a 
result, demand for industrial expansion dramatically increased and several 
industrial parks were established in the peripheries to the north, the north-
east and the south of the city.115 It was during this time that an increasingly 
profitable practice in land speculation began, as traditional urban spaces 
were essentially transferred to the private construction sector in order to 
feed the booming demand for industrial land and consequently, new resi-
dential developments.116
The quick industrialization process resulted in a radical change in Queréta-
ro’s morphology. All around the major highways that connected the city, 
space was transformed, fueled by the collective desire to ‘modernize’ the 
city and to accommodate production, services and housing for a booming 
population,117 which more than doubled again in a twenty year period, go-
ing from 103,907 inhabitants in 1960 to 293,586 inhabitants in 1980.118
As was mentioned, it was during the 1960s and 1970s decades when the 
manufacturing and real estate development sectors of industry gained a 
privileged position in the city, which motivated the expansion of the ur-
ban limits over prime agricultural land. This corresponds to a spatial growth 
model that prioritized financial economics. The intention of this model was 
to maximize the monetary return on investment with the construction of 
luxury housing, luxury department stores,  and corporate offices, all along 
the peripheries of the city, causing the complete rupture of the original 
compact urban form that was maintained for over four centuries.119
114 Gonález Gómez, n.d.
115 Aragón Domínguez, n.d.
116 González Gómez, n.d.
117 ibid.
118 INEGI, 1940-2010
119 González Gómez, n.d.
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It is important to note that, even with the city’s expansion and develop-
ment furor, social housing development was kept to a minimum, as most 
new developments focused on middle and upper classes. This represented 
a severe neglect that directly translated in a lack of low-cost housing for 
rent, a tension that ultimately caused the emergence of illegal settlements, 
mostly within communal land in ejido ownership.120
On September 19, 1985, Mexico City suffered the most destructive earth-
quake to date: with a 7.7 intensity on the Richter scale, it killed more than 
seven thousand people, displaced more than fifty thousand people, and 
destroyed around four hundred and fifty buildings. As a result, a mass exo-
dus from the capital into neighboring cities, including Querétaro, occurred. 
This phenomenon, combined with the vertiginous process of industrial-
ization and urbanization that consolidated during the previous decades 
and has continued until present days, resulted in the conurbation with the 
neighboring municipalities of Corregidora, El Marqués and, in a much lesser 
degree, Huimilpan.121
Spillover from both Querétaro outwards and from these neighboring 
municipalities in the opposite direction -motivated by the expansion re-
quirements of Querétaro itself- fused the four municipalities into what is 
now known as the Querétaro Metropolitan Region (Zona Metropolitana de 
Querétaro, ZMQ) (See Fig. 1).122
Even though the ZMQ has become a cohesive urban center that shares 
urban challenges as a single unit, the scope of this thesis will only focus 
on the municipality of Querétaro. With an estimated population of about 
802,000,123 the municipality of Querétaro accounts for 75 percent of the to-
tal Metropolitan Region population. It is by far the most populous munici-
pality in the region, and the State of Querétaro. It is interesting to note that 
the total ZMQ’s population of around 1.1 million people represents 60% of 
the total population of the State of Querétaro.124
120 ibid.
121 Aragón Domínguez, n.d.
122 Arvizu García, 2005
123 INEGI - Instituto Nacional de Geografía y Estadística (2010). Principales resultados del Censo de 




Chapter Two: Literature Review








Figure 1. Querétaro Metropolitan Zone: Context
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Figure 2. Querétaro: Municipal Delegations
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Today, the municipality of Querétaro is divided into seven administrative 
zones, or delegations (See Fig. 2).
Querétaro’s growth and physical transformation can be attributed to sev-
eral reasons, beginning with the city’s economic boom. As it has been the 
case since the 1950’s, the industrial sector plays a fundamental role in the 
growth and expansion of the city, which has benefitted from a continuously 
evolving and diversifying industrial and commercial sector. The diversifica-
tion of Querétaro’s economy constitutes a strategic move that has led to the 
establishment of an aeronautical production and research hub, as well as 
service industries focused on software development and information tech-
nologies, outsourcing, and logistics services, among others.125
Furthermore, the city’s infrastructure has played a fundamental role in 
not only facilitating growth, but guiding it. Querétaro is location along one 
of the most important highway in the country, which connects Mexico City 
with the United States, has created facilitated the city’s expansion along this 
route (See Fig. 3).
In addition to the favorable economic climate and infrastructure that the 
city has offered throughout the last decades, Querétaro has become a bea-
con of ‘decent’ quality of life, sought by many families that flee from the 
persistent climate of insecurity and violence, especially from the northern 
regions.126 Additionally, Querétaro has become an important destination 
for tertiary education -the city has a solid base of both private and public 
higher education institutions- and young professionals -who are attracted 
by the constantly growing industrial and specialized service sectors-, espe-
cially those who are originally from the surrounding states.127 As a result, 
Querétaro has an overwhelmingly young population, with a median age of 
26.128 In the same line, in 2014 it was estimated that there was an average 
influx of 68 people per day, making the yearly total over 20 thousand new 
residents.129 
125 Aragón Domínguez, n.d.
126 Arreola, Juan José (2011, January 24). Aumenta migración a Querétaro por violencia. El Universal. 
Online Periodical <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/79353.html>.




129 Rosas, Sirse and Colin, Marvella (2014, May 30). Zona Metropolitana de Querétaro crece sin freno- El 
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Mexico City - USA Highway
2010 Census Urban Extents
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N
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Figure 3. Development along the Mexico City - USA Highway
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Ultimately, however, migration patterns in the city have become a cause 
of economic stress for Querétaro’s poor: as industry continues its specializa-
tion, there is less demand for basic jobs that unskilled workers can perform. 
In addition, food and transportation costs are constantly increasing, while 
rental prices and land values follow the same pattern.130 As the poorer sec-
tors are pushed out by increasing land values and a lack of low-cost hous-
ing, a pattern that was described earlier in this section occurs: informal set-
tlements emerge, usually in areas where tenure, zoning, and environmental 
factors should not allow any human settlement.
The short-term solution that has been adopted by the city to try to ac-
commodate the high influx of migrants in the city is to promote habitation 
uses, through the modification of the existing land use instruments, in va-
cant spaces most commonly located on the peripheries of the city; a devel-
opment model that exacerbates uncontrolled urban expansion. 
Furthermore, the increased housing demand that results from the mas-
sive migration into the city, combined with social prejudice and socioeco-
nomic disparities, has resulted in the proliferation, all throughout the city 
but most notoriously on the suburban peripheries, of gated communities, a 
residential development typology “in which residents own or control com-
mon areas or shared amenities [which] carries with it reciprocal rights and 
obligations enforced by a private governing body.”131
Fueled with the collective paranoia that has been induced by the climate 
of insecurity that the country has experienced in recent years, these types 
of communities cater to the upper classes that seek to ‘defend themselves’ 
against potential robbery, or even kidnapping.132 In addition, this type of 
residential segregation is actually endorsed and enforced by local planning 
policies. In fact, Article 282 of the Municipal Construction Regulations Doc-
ument for Santiago de Querétaro (Reglamento de Construcción para el Mu-
nicipio de Querétaro), a regulatory framework that informs the city’s Partial 
Financiero, Online Periodical <ttp://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/zona-metropolitana-de-Queréta-
ro-crece-sin-freno.html>.
130  Leovy, Jill (2001, February 18). A Mexican City’s Middle-Class Transformation. Los Angeles Times, 
Online Periodical, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/18/news/mn-27168>.
131 Low, Setha (2001) The Edge and the center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban Fear. 
American Anthropologist, 103(1): 45-58; p. 47
132 ibid.
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Development Plan, states that “urban lots must have a surrounding wall, 
which in the case of a condominium, it must be of a minimum height of 
2.20 meters.”133 Stated in different words, it is illegal to develop a vacant lot 
as a condominium if it does not include a peripheral wall or fence to enclose 
it. “It is no wonder that in many Latin American cities, gated communities 
have become one of the most profitable real estate businesses of the last 
decade.”134 This is an episode of private investors and banks actually financ-
ing and profiting from urban regulations that promote spatial fragmenta-
tion and social polarization. Many popular neighborhoods, including the 
Historic City Center, are emptying, as the poor are apparently being pushed 
to the peripheral informal settlements, and the middle classes are opting for 
modern homes and apartments,135 most of the time in gated communities.
133 Municipio de Querétaro (2013). Reglamento de Construcción para el Municipio de Querétaro. Transla-
tion by Author.
134 Libertun de Duren, Nora (2006)- Planning á la Carte: The Location Patterns of Gated Communities 
around Buenos Aires in a Decentralized Planning Context. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 
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Having understood the complexities behind deregulation and land ten-
ure in the Mexican context, the following section is devoted to research 
methodology that I propose for this thesis. 
The main objective of this thesis, as I mentioned in the introduction, is 
to study land use changes throughout the last two decades in the city of 
Querétaro, the effects that these changes have had on the physical form 
of the city, and the possible contribution that these changes have made to 
the proliferation of human settlements, both informal and ‘sanctioned’, at 
the fringes of the city.
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3.1
Mapping Land Use Changes: 
1997-2007
Even though the city of Querétaro, in its Metropolitan Region, is com-
prised of 4 municipalities that share the same urban space, I limited the 
focus of this study to the largest of the four, the Municipality of Querétaro.
In order to analyze land use changes, I collected official land use records 
for the entire municipality with the assistance of Santiago de Querétaro’s 
Secretariat for Sustainable Development, through its Urban Development 
Directorate. In their original format, these plans are divided into an indi-
vidual plan for each of the seven delegations (See Appendix 1), within two 
time frames: (1) 1997 and (2) 2007, the most recent official land use plan. 
The reasoning behind these two dates is simple: these are the years in 
which the Partial Development Plans for the municipality were updated. It 
was impossible for me to obtain an earlier version than that of 1997 in the 
Municipal archives. 
In their original form, I collected each delegation’s plan for each year in 
this study on PDF format, as scans of the official records in the Municipal 
archive. As such, the first step in this research was to digitize these records 
into a format that enables spatial analysis. In this case, I traced the records 
in ArcMAP, a Geographic Information System (GIS), in a way that allowed me 
to spatially compare both datasets. I focused on the following attributes:
1) All those parcels that have been assigned any type of urban use, 
which includes, but is not limited to: residential in a variety of densities, 
commercial, industrial in a variety of modalities, urban equipment, and 
neighborhood centers. All these parcels were identified with the code “U” 
for processing.
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2) All those parcels that have been assigned the Urban Park category, 
which denotes a protected area within the urban core, which is intended 
for public recreation. These parcels were identified with the code “PU” for 
processing.
3) All those parcels that have been assigned any kind of protected use, 
which range from ecological protection, to archaeological site, to agricul-
tural reserves - ejidos. These parcels were identified with the code “AP” for 
processing.
4) The Querétaro River, a body of water that transverses the city from 
west to east, was identified with the code “R”.
5) All those parcels for which data is not available in either of the ana-
lyzed datasets, were identified with the code “ND”.
This process was intended to produce two aggregate, municipality-wide, 
shapefiles, one for each time frame. Once the two shapefiles were created, 
I superimposed them as a way to assess which parcels have suffered land 
use changes from Protected, to Urban. This process followed the following 
steps:
1) All those parcels with either a ‘Protected’ code (AP) or ‘Urban Park’ 
code (PU) in 1997, were isolated to export a new Shapefile with only these 
attributes. 
2) Similarly, all those parcels with an ‘Urban’ code (U), were isolated to 
export a new Shapefile with only these attributes.
3) Once these two Shapefiles had been created, it was possible to se-
lect all those parcels that were ‘Protected’ in 1997 but changed its status to 
‘Urban’ in 2007. 
The resulting Shapefile indicates the parcels around the city which suf-
fered Land Use changes between the two years of study.
It is very important to note that the two resulting maps from the previous 
process only show changes in land use. They do not, in fact, show where the 
city is actually being built. To this effect, the 2010 Population Census proved 
very useful. Among the available products of the Census, data on the actual 
extents of the urban form down to the block level can be found. Using this 
dataset, I compared what is zoned for urban development, to what was ac-
50
Chapter Three: Research Design
FREEING THE INVISIBLE HAND // JORGE CASAR RODRÍGUEZ // MAY 2016 
tually part of the urban built environment in 2010. I also compared this map 
with the latest available aerial pictures in the city. 
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In order to assess if there is a causal relationship between the way land 
use is handled by the municipality and where human settlements are oc-
curring, this section of my analysis is devoted to mapping exactly that: 
human settlements in the city. The process is inspired by a section of the 
methodology proposed by Harner, et al.136 In their paper, they catalogued 
every land-development transaction that happened between 1970 and 
2000 in the four main municipalities that make up the Guadalajara Metro-
politan Region. These records include project location, boundaries, number 
of housing units, among others. These data sets were categorized as:
1) Formal “social interest” or government sponsored housing
2) “Higher-income” housing”
3) Informal housing 
After all these records were mapped and classified, they calculated the 
estimate of the total population in each housing category, using a GIS, over-
laying a census data layer that contained the population in block-level sta-
tistical areas (Área Geográfica Estadística Básica, AGEB). 
 For my research, I used the previous methodology as a basic frame-
work to study the effects of land regulation change on housing. As it is ex-
pected, I needed to modify the basic methodology so that it adapted to the 
available data sets, and to the particular research objectives of my analysis. 
 
I collected data with the aid of the Sustainable Development Secretariat 
of the Querétaro State Government, and General Secretariat of the Queréta-
136 Research paper “Buying Development: Housing and Urban Growth in Guadalajara, Mexico” (2009).
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ro Municipal Government, through its Territorial Regularization office. They 
provided a complete catalog of irregular human settlements within the 
municipal jurisdiction, which includes 207 individual records in 6 of the 
7 delegations (there are no records of informal settlements in the Histor-
ic Core, Delegación Centro Historico). Additionally, the collected data in-
cludes 376 historical records of all subdivisions and settlements that have 
been approved since 1949 in the municipality of Querétaro. Since this study 
focused on the possible effects of neoliberalization in Mexican land use 
policy, I only mapped records starting in 1995, to focus on the timeframe 
that has elapsed since the successful and complete implementation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. This corresponds to 157 records. It 
is important to note that the available records only include year of autho-
rization, name of subdivision/settlement, and delegation in which they are 
located. As a result:
1) The mapping process relied also on personal experience, and the as-
sistance of another mapping software, Google Earth, to locate and correctly 
georeference the subdivisions of interest.
2) I did not make a distinction between ‘social housing’ and ‘higher in-
come housing’. In order to make such a distinction, I would have needed a 
certain degree of subjective interpretation - housing types in this category, 
as Harner et al point out, fall along a spectrum rather than into two discrete 
categories. 
Once both types of settlements were mapped, I compared their locations 
with the 2010 Census Urban Extents ShapeFile, in order to assess which of 
the catalogued settlements had already been developed, and which were 
developed after the 2010 census. Essentially, this provided a clear picture of 
the rate of development before and after the census. 
While the previous information provides a valuable baseline in assessing 
the municipality’s expansion, what is of interest for this study is, actually, 
the relationship between these settlements and the land use changes that 
occurred in the same period of time. I intersected the ShapeFiles that re-
sulted from the previous steps in order to assess this possible relationship. 
Because some of the settlements have grown, and even emerged, since the 
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2007 Land Use maps, some of the settlements did not fully align with the 
Land Use geometries. To compensate for this, I considered the centroids of 
the settlement geometries as their definitive location. 
As as final step, I analyzed a sampled the developments that correspond 
to the previous intersection of Shapefiles, essentially those developments 
that have happened on land that has undergone a change of use in the pe-
riod of study, in order to assess possible development patterns in these ar-
eas. I used both aerial and street view photography on some of these sites, 
looking for:
1) Type of subdivision:
 a. Formal
  i. Planned community
  ii. Traditional subdivision
  iii. Other
 b. Informal
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4.1
Summary
My research produced several findings that are worth noting. Through-
out this process, I was able to track down all those parcels within the mu-
nicipality that have received land use changes in the period between 1997 
and 2007. As it will be seen in detail throughout this section, more than 7 
thousand hectares have undergone the process of land use change from 
protected, to urban land. As I drilled deeper, I also noticed that as of 2010, 
almost half of the land in the municipality that was zoned for urban use had 
not yet been built on. This fact suggests most of the land use changes hap-
pened at the end of the ten-year period, aiming for development projects 
that had not yet been built in 2010. Essentially, development potential in 
the city has exploded since the mid-2000s. 
However, the most striking finding had to do with the second part of my 
approach to understand the city of Querétaro, in which I mapped out both 
all formal development that has been approved sin 1995, and all catalogued 
informal settlements within the municipality. After the extensive mapping 
and analysis of aerial and street-level images, I was able to tell that the vast 
majority of the land that has been incorporated to the urban boundaries 
by changing protected land uses, is destined for private development in 
the form of gated communities. This suggests that we are creating a city of 
private enclaves of homogenous populations. Quite predictably, these new 
developments are following infrastructure –mainly, roads and highways- 
provision. Throughout the following section, I provide more detail. 
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4.2
Mapping Land Use Changes: 
1997-2007
The municipality of Querétaro has a total extension of 78,026 hectares. In 
1997, only one fifth of the municipality’s total extension seems to have been 
allocated for urban uses. However, it is of note that almost half of the munic-
ipality’s extension is missing data for this year. It is possible to hypothesize 
a reason for this: at the time of the Plans’ drafting, planners only focused on 
the completely urbanized areas of the municipality, leaving large portions 
of Vicente Carrillo Puerto and Santa Rosa Jauregui, the two delegations with 
more protected land within their limits, out of the official maps. As a result, 
only 30% of the total municipality’s extension is categorized as Protected or 
Urban Park (See Table 1).
Table 1. Allocated land uses in 1997
ALLOCATION AREA (HECTARES) AREA (PERCENT)
Protected/Urban Park 23,774 30%
Urban 16,240 21%
River 39 0.05%
No Data 37,973 48.05%
Total 78,026 100%
In contrast, by 2007 land allocations shifted around. The most important 
change that can be noticed is that the entirety of the municipality had been 
mapped out. As a result, all those sections that had been labeled as No data, 
now show a specific allocation, on either the Protected/Urban Park, or the 
urban categories (See Table 2).
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Table 2. Allocated land uses in 2007
ALLOCATION AREA (HECTARES) AREA (PERCENT)
Protected/Urban Park 50,796 65%
Urban 27,183 35%
River 39 0.05%
No Data 0 0%
Total 78,026 100%
Since than important part of the parcels has no land use allocation in 
1997, I only evaluated land use changes on those sections of the munici-
pality where there is actually data for both timeframes. Between 1997 and 
2007, a total of 7,356 hectares received a land use change, from any kind of 
protected use, to an urban use that is suitable for development. Taking into 
account that there were originally 16,240 hectares classified as Urban, the 
addition of more than 7 thousand hectares represents an increase of 45% 
in ten years. Furthermore, this addition of urban land is, at least, 27% of the 
27,183 hectares that are classified as urban land in 2007. Figures 4 and 5 
show the two stages of land use, 1997 and 2007, and Figure 6 highlights, in 
red, all those areas that went from Protected to Urban in the period of study.
According to the 2010 National Census, the municipality of Querétaro 
had an urban extent of 14,620 hectares. Comparing this extension to the 
area of land that is actually zoned for development, or 27,183 hectares, we 
can assume that, in 2010, there were 12,563 hectares, or 46 percent of the 
total, of free land ready to build on. This is a staggering number, and can be 
visually appreciated on Figure 7.
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Figure 4. Land use allocation in 1997
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Figure 5. Land use allocation in 2007
60
Chapter Four: Findings










Figure 6.Land that went from Protected to Urban in the period of study
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Figure 7. Urban extents in 2010 v. total land zoned for development
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 I mapped both irregular and authorized settlements on the same 
map as a way to visually assess their spatial distribution. Currently, there are 
207 individual records of irregular settlements within the municipality, and 
157 subdivisions that, according to the municipal registry, were authorized 
between 1995 and 2015. I was only able to locate 90 of these settlements, 
either because some of the provided references were too vague to locate, 
or because the described settlement corresponded to an irregular settle-
ment, in which case I gave priority to that characteristic, and mapped it as 
part of the informal settlement group (See Fig. 8).
When compared to the 2010 Census extents, 8.7 percent of the total built 
area in the city corresponded to informal settlements, while almost 14 per-
cent corresponded to ‘formal’ settlements that had been approved by the 
municipality and constructed137 since 1995. Informal settlements outside of 
the 2010 extents amount to a growth of almost 5 percent over the original 
extents, and approved settlements that had not been built by 2010, but 
exist now, correspond to a growth of over 18 percent (See Table 3). These 
figures are important because they provide a general idea of what has hap-
pened in the city since 2010. Essentially, the built out area grew by, at least, 
3,359 hectares in 5 years, from 14,620 hectares in 2010 to around 17,969 at 
the end of 2014.
137 I make this distinction because there may be cases where certain subdivisions/settlements were 
approved before 2010, but had not been developed at the time of the census.
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Figure 8. Identified human settlements
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Table 3. Human settlements: Spatial characteristics
Mapped Count 207 90
Total Area (Hectares) 1,976 4,693
Area within 2010 Cen-
sus Extents (Hectares)
1,275 2,035
Area developed after 
2010 (Hectares)
701 2,658
Comparing both sets of settlements with the areas within the municipal-
ity in which there has been a change of use, from Protected to Urban, pro-
vided very interesting results. 
Out of the 207 catalogued informal settlements, 29 are within areas that 
underwent a change of use. In addition, there are 9 settlements located on 
areas that still have a Protected use (See Table 4).
Table 4. Informal settlements, by location




Located in areas zoned 
for Urban uses in 1997
169 / 1,554.5 82% / 79%
Located in areas that 
underwent use change
29 / 248 14% / 12%
Located in protected 
areas
9 / 173.5 4% / 9%
Somewhat unexpectedly, the majority of the settlements currently cat-
alogued as ‘informal’, approximately 4/5ths, are located in areas that were 
already zoned for urban uses in 1997. This fact leads to the logical conclu-
sion that these settlements already existed at the time of the drafting of 
the 1997 Land Use plans, but the regularization process has not concluded. 
As for the rest of the settlements, they emerged later than 1997 on parcels 
that were considered protected, but have gone through land use changes - 
assumingly, as a last resort -, in hopes that someday these settlements, too, 
will be regularized. 
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In the case of the regular settlements, out of the 90 that I was able to suc-
cessfully locate, an impressive 36 are within areas that underwent a change 
of use. This number becomes even more revealing when actual areas are 
accounted for: these 36 subdivisions have a total aggregate area of 2,464 
hectares, which is at least138 a third (33.5 percent) of the total land that re-
ceived land use changes in the period of study.
138 Not considering, of course, those developments that I could not successfully locate
Informal Settlements on PROTECTED land
Informal Settlements on land that changed use
Formal Settlements on land that changed use
2010 Census Urban Extents
Protected Use
Zoned for Urban Uses in 2007
0 5 mi
N
Figure 9. Human settlements on land that underwent a land use change
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The final step of my research, in which I sampled five of the develop-
ments139 that have been built on tracts of land with recent land use chang-
es, yielded interesting results:
SITE 1
i.  Type: Formal, planned community
II. Approximate Density: 29 dwelling units per  hectare (11 du/acre)
139 I have intentionally kept the location and any direct identifiers of these developments, confidential.
Figure 10. Site 1: Boundaries
Source: Google Images
Figure 11. Site 1: Latest Aerial View 
(2015)
Source: Google Images
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SITE 2
i.  Type: Formal, gated subdivision
II. Approximate Density: 90 dwelling units per  hectare (36 du/acre)
Figure 13. Site 2: Boundaries
Source: Google Images
Figure 14. Site 2: Latest Aerial View 
(2015)
Source: Google Images
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SITE 3
i.  Type: Informal
II. Approximate Density: 80 dwelling units per  hectare (32 du/acre)
Figure 16. Site 3: Boundaries
Source: Google Images
Figure 17. Site 3: Latest Aerial View 
(2015)
Source: Google Images
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SITE 4
i.  Type: Formal, planned community
II. Approximate Density: 32 dwelling units per  hectare (13 du/acre)
Figure 19. Site 4: Boundaries
Source: Google Images
Figure 20. Site 4: Latest Aerial View 
(2015)
Source: Google Images
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SITE 5
i.  Type: Formal, gated subdivision
II. Approximate Density: 50 dwelling units per  hectare (20 du/acre)
Figure 22. Site 5: Boundaries
Source: Google Images
Figure 24. Site 5: Latest Aerial View 
(2015)
Source: Google Images
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4.4
Discussion
This research revealed that, in the period of interest, at least 33.5 percent 
of the land that underwent a land use change, from Protected to Urban, 
was allocated to the production of housing. An aerial analysis of the corre-
sponding polygons reveals that 35 out of the 36 subdivisions are actually 
destined for gated communities. The only subdivision that remains corre-
sponds to an industrial polygon located at the northern edge of the city. 
In the background section, I explained how the city prohibits the subdi-
vision and development of tracts of land under a condominium scheme 
without the provision of walls. Essentially, it is impossible for developers to 
build condominiums if they are not gated communities. It is not surprising, 
then, that almost every single development that has been approved by the 
municipality since 1997 has taken this form. Even those developments that 
under a simple aerial inspection appear to be sold as social housing -essen-
tially, that receive subsidies and are within the INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE 
programs- are being developed as gated communities for the working 
class. As the spatial analysis I performed and mapping process that followed 
show, the overwhelming majority of these gated communities are being 
located on the peripheries of the municipality, especially on the northern 
edges where vast amounts of land is available for development. 
Gated communities are both the unexpected consequence of economic 
liberalization, and the expected outcome of a savvy development industry 
taking control of the strategic decisions that shape and guide the growth of 
the city. With massive amounts of cheap land that have been made ready 
for development - there are still thousands of hectares of land that have 
been transformed from Protected reserves to Urban - it makes absolutely 
no financial sense to propose real estate projects that densify tracts of land 
close to the city in more socially and environmentally sustainable manners. 
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Low-density, single family homes represent the overwhelming majority of 
what is being produced in these closed communities. By creating secluded 
enclaves, socially homogenous140 sectors of the population are engulfed in 
a socio spatial segregation process, which both severely fragments the city 
and consumes absurd amounts of land for relatively low quantities of peo-
ple to live in.
Considering the climate of acute social polarization and extreme inequal-
ity in which Mexico is engulfed, - which is also a consequence of economic 
policy mishandling since the very birth of the nation-, it is completely un-
derstandable that the population seeks additional security in their homes. 
The development industry, of course, has picked up on this as an extremely 
profitable marketing tool. After all, now a days, a decreasing amount of peo-
ple want to live in neighborhoods that are not protected by anti-burglary 
systems and are surrounded by high, windowless walls that emulate some 
sort of modern fortress.141 What’s interesting about this is that these gated 
communities are, in fact, not catering to the rich. The development indus-
try has brilliantly realized that selling an aspirational model that emulates a 
high-class, exclusive lifestyle, and offers it to the middle and even working 
classes142 is extremely profitable. Under this realization, the real estate in-
dustry has formed strategic alliances with the banking and social housing 
institutions to make this model a reality. And now the circle has come to 
completion, as this model is not only sanctioned, but promoted, by the lo-
cal government. 
I recall the very definition of Neoliberalism, in which the state is expected 
to limit its intervention to only providing an institutional framework that 
allows free trade, enhances property rights, and advances entrepreneurial 
freedoms. In the municipality of Querétaro, we can actually see this hap-
pening. The local government is advancing free market interests by en-
forcing a framework that promotes subdivision under condominium ten-
ure, and rules out the possibility of a variety of housing typologies in any 
new development that occurs within its jurisdiction. The bottom line is that 
the city -represented by urban politicians, urban administration and urban 
planning has surrendered control to powerful private economic actors.143 
140 Garcia Peralta and Hofer, 2006
141 ibid.
142 ibid.
143 Borsdorf, Axel and Hidalgo, Rodrigo (2008). New dimensions of social exclusion in Latin America: 
From gated communities to gated cities, the case of Santiago de Chile. Land Use Policy, 25: 153-160.
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City officials, especially those on top and in charge of making the most im-
portant city planning decisions, seem to have surrendered their political 
will to act in the city’s best interests, which sometimes will run against these 
private actors, presumably because these same interests have had a big in-
fluence in their political careers.
  Neoliberal implementation not only in Mexico, but around the globe, has 
been very successful because proponents of this model were able to effec-
tively convince the world that a mixed model with enhanced government 
intervention produces corruption, and weak governance, arguing that the 
only way to produce economic discipline was to strengthen the market 
economy. They essentially missed the point. The issue here is not a matter 
of market against bureaucracy. It is a matter of an utter lack of competence 
in the state, in either scenario. In the mixed economy before neoliberalism, 
the Mexican example made it clear that competent governance was not 
one of the PRI’s strengths. Right now, within a strict neoliberal framework, 
with an “almost theological belief in the existence of something called ‘the 
market’,”144 ” the same lack of competence is shown, as the authority has 
completely backed off, causing a free-for-all situation in which a small mi-
nority call all the shots. Yes, we need the markets, but leaving the markets 
to work on their own does not work. They must be governed by competent 
authorities that are able to regulate and guide development in a sustain-
able manner. 
Going back to the land regulation problem, I am convinced that the re-
sponsibility of the chaos that we have generated does not lie solely on the 
development industry. It lies on the incompetence of local, regional, and 
even Federal governments to come up with efficient regulatory solutions. 
In fact, I am convinced that cities depend on the private sector to thrive: 
property taxes, exactions, and overall economic buoyancy, not to mention 
that the development industry is the only one capable of meeting at least 
part of the growing demands for housing in the country, are great positive 
outcomes of a strong real estate development industry. But I also believe 
that the private sector needs to be regulated, and guided, towards sustain-
able development.
The other side of the story falls into place here. What happens to all those 
people that cannot afford to live in these secluded enclaves, even those 
intended to cater to the working sectors of society? The short answer is, the 
144 I attribute this term to endless conversations with my advisor, Elliott Sclar, in which we theorized 
about all sorts of fun topics
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market prices them out, and informal housing starts to emerge.
Since the premise of informal production of housing is that it happens, 
as its name indicates, informally and outside the control of municipal au-
thority, the task of analyzing these settlements is not an easy one. Even so, 
this research confirmed some of my initial ideas around the phenomenon 
of informal housing production. For instance, the fact that the vast majori-
ty of human settlements that the local government considers informal are 
located within land that is zoned for urban use. This leads me to conclude 
that either the informality of these settlements lies on the fact that land was 
subdivided without proper permits - which is very common in the Mexican 
context, or that these settlements were established prior to the drafting of 
the 1997 Plan, and the local authority has since then changed the land use 
to adapt to the new reality of the plot, but it is still in the process of fully reg-
ularizing -coming up with official property documentation, urban services, 
and guarantee of tenure, for example. The fact that, as I explained in the 
Background section, the State uses land regularization as a very effective 
political tool produces certain negative consequences that are relevant for 
my conclusions. For instance, once a certain plot or settlement has been for-
mally regularized, it immediately falls out of the radar that monitors social 
welfare in informal settlements, 145  and making it extremely difficult to ob-
jectively assess how many people actually live in substandard conditions.





5.2 Promote regional 
governance
5.3.Stimulate a  stronger rental 
market
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The findings that I laid out in the previous section confirm the initial hy-
pothesis that liberalization in land regulation policies, and in fact a gener-
alized liberalization of the national economy, has had unexpected conse-
quences, like the proliferation of human settlements at the fringes of the 
cities in an unplanned manner. In addition, I have also found that most of 
the changes of land use are occurring to serve the particular interests of the 
real estate development industry, and the creation of the secluded enclaves 
known as gated communities, and that urban informality persists as a reali-
ty in the urban landscape of the municipality of Querétaro. 
Throughout this section, I will explore recommendations that address the 
issues and findings that I touched upon in previous sections. These recom-
mendations are made on the governance level, and their implementation 
will definitely depend on the willingness of relevant actors to make real and 
difficult political compromises in order to begin instituting change towards 
a more sustainable and inclusive urban growth model.
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5.1
Regulate Growth
As of the 2010 Census, there were more than 12,000 hectares of available 
land already zoned for various urban uses. Five years after that count, this 
number had only decreased by around 3,400 hectares, bringing the total 
down to around 8,500 hectares. If the city follows this development pattern 
-assuming it operates in a linear fashion- these 8,500 hectares will be con-
sumed in the next 10 to 15 years, almost doubling the current extension of 
the urban, built out limits. This is, undoubtedly, an extremely unsustainable 
model that has all sorts of direct, negative consequences, which range from 
the degradation of valuable agricultural land, to an increase in traffic con-
gestion and further social polarization.
The good news is that there are ways to curb these patterns. Alas, they are 
not easy tasks.
Prior to the Agrarian reform, in a time when ejido lands could only be des-
tined for agricultural production, their relationship with neighboring urban 
areas made them naturally-occurring urban containment instruments; es-
sentially, urban growth could not happen when cities expanded to a point 
where they reached the boundaries of ejido land. In the current context, 
these growth boundaries have completely disappeared. 
While I’m not proposing reversing land use regulation to what it was be-
fore - that would be absolutely impossible, and frankly, pointless-, I am pro-
posing the adoption of a specific strategy for urban containment: the adop-
tion of a strict Urban Service Areas Ordinance, or Adequate Public Facility 
Ordinance (APFO), a strategy that is flexible enough to be realistically im-
plemented, but effective enough so that local and regional authorities can 
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make effective decisions about the future of Querétaro’s urban landscape. 
Essentially, APFO’s guide development by requiring that infrastructure be 
in place before permitting development.146 But deciding how, and when, 
to expand infrastructure, the city decides where development happens. 
Currently, land local land regulation is linked to political strategy: with the 
incentive of increasing its tax revenue, the local authority will extend urban 
services almost anywhere in the city.  By strictly limiting urban services to a 
more compact area around existing development, it might be possible to 
begin curbing unnecessary urban sprawl. Additionally, a system of develop-
ment rights transfer could also be implemented, as a way to include those 
parcels that are outside of the service limits in the development market, by 
allowing them to ‘sell’ the rights that their parcel would have to landowners 
in more convenient locations, who would receive these rights in the form of 
density bonuses, or tax credits, for example. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to locate a successful case study within the 
Mexican context in which an APFO ordinance was adopted to curb sprawl. 
This is a predominantly American policy response, for which no precedent 
in the local context exists. The same is true for density and development 
bonuses, another clearly American response to manage growth. However, 
I believe that the local normative framework could be adapted to include 
these policies. 
In its current state, local policy promotes social exclusion by favoring the 
development of homogenous, single family neighborhoods in gated en-
claves. This law must be amended to also promote the development of cen-
tral, mixed neighborhoods, which in combination with the Urban Service 
Boundary that was mentioned earlier, encourages real estate developers 
to avoid looking at exurban locations for development projects. Before de-
velopment can shift towards more central areas, exurban land supply must 
be considerably limited, which is where the Urban Service Boundary comes 
into place. 
Density also comes with a price: urban congestion. This is why planning 
policy should also address the transportation issue, which has been totally 
focused on infrastructure projects that serve the private automobile. Public 
146 Pendall, Rolf, Martin, Jonathan, and Fulton, William (2002). Holding the Line: Urban Containment in 
the United States. Brookings Institution.
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transit is lagging behind. But that is another story, for another time. 
 A severe limitation to density, which also results in the ability to cre-
ate a more socially equitable urban landscape where a diversity of incomes 
coexist, is the current cultural perspectives and classist bias, two character-
istics of the Mexican collective idiosyncrasy that are extremely difficult to 
change. But we must try!
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Due to research constraints, I have only focused on the municipality of 
Querétaro. However, the city also includes three other municipalities that 
are also part of the city as a single, functioning organism. Physical integra-
tion has been a reality for more than a decade now, but regional gover-
nance is still poor, if at all existent. Currently, every municipality functions 
and makes decisions in a vacuum state that does not take into account the 
region as a whole. An inter-municipal, governmental entity that address-
es key strategic issues, such as migration, growth, and economic develop-
ment, and that includes representatives from all the municipalities in the 
Metropolitan Region, should be created.
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5.3
Stimulate a stronger rental 
market
A big consequence of leaving the market to regulate itself, as it has been 
mentioned earlier, is that the lowest income brackets end up being exclud-
ed from the formal housing market. Since the existing ‘social housing’ insti-
tutions are focused on financing and subsidizing home ownership, it is pos-
sible to conclude that a significant formal rental market that caters to the 
urban poor is non-existent. In fact, for the past 40 to 50 years, every move in 
the social housing has been towards favoring the increase of homeowners 
in the country.147  In a similar way to Gilbert and Varley (1981), I would ad-
vocate for a shift of a portion of the resources destined for homeownership 
programs towards the stimulation of a rental market, targeted for the urban 
poor that could not otherwise afford to leave the informal settlements in 
which they currently reside.
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Even though this thesis has shed light on some of the consequences of 
neoliberal regulation, there is still many limitations in this study that are 
worth pointing out. 
Finding an objective way to measure city expansion based on housing 
production, in both forms, proved very difficult. Since the city is not a static 
organism, we must rely on specific ‘snapshots’ to tell stories about urban 
form. This is never easy, and it relies too much on the quality of the available 
data. While I was able to secure useful data sets, there were certain missing 
attributes that would have made my research even more powerful, such 
as a clear distinction between what income brackets are the studied sub-
divisions, which would have been helpful to inform my conclusions. This 
represents a great opportunity to embark in further study. 
Additionally, the time frame of the land use maps that I was able to secure 
really limited my research. The land tenure liberalization process happened 
between 1992 and 1995, so it would have been useful to obtain land use 
maps with prior dates, in order to have a more complete picture of how 
land use transformation happened in the city. This also represents a great 
area for further study.
Another area of further exploration will soon become available, as the 
Land Use plans will soon be updated and publicly released. Further analysis 
of these new maps will allow an assessment of the most recent land use 
changes and growth patterns, after 2007. 
As for the approved subdivisions, I used the 1995-present time-frame to 
match the adoption of NAFTA and the available data on land use changes. 
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But, it would be interesting to map out the entirety of the existing data set, 
which dates back to 1949, in order to further assess the development pat-
tern of the city. 
Finally, since I wasn’t able to locate a specific successful case study for a 
normative framework that regulates growth, it would be very useful to em-
bark in research as to the best ways to adapt these US-centered responses 
to the Mexican context. This could include an adaptation toolkit that touch-
es on phasing, public participation, and political strategy, for example, that 
would make it easier for local governments that do want to adopt progres-
sive planning policies to do so effectively. 
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No. AÑO DE AUTORIZACION NOMBRE DEL FRACCIONAMIENTO/ASENTAMIENTO DELEGACION TIPO
219 1995 AMPLIACIÓN CLUB CAMPESTRE JVH FRACC
220 1995 CORREGIDORA SRJ FRACC
221 1995 HACIENDA EL CAMPANARIO- SECCIÓN MIRADORES VCR FRACC
222 1995 LAS AZUCENAS FOS FRACC
223 1995 PRIVADA JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
224 1996 BOSQUES DE LAS LOMAS JVH FRACC
225 1996 EL SOL II (LA HUERTA) FOS FRACC
226 1996 EL SOL III (LA LUNA) FOS FRACC
227 1996 EX-HDA  SANTANA FOS FRACC
228 1996 LA HUERTA FCP FRACC
229 1996 LA LOMA FOS FRACC
230 1996 LA LUNA FCP FRACC
231 1996 LAS FLORES SRJ FRACC
232 1996 MILENIO III VCR FRACC
233 1996 NUEVO JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
234 1996 PARQUE INDUSTRIAL QUERETARO SRJ FRACC
235 1996 PUERTA DEL SOL I FOS FRACC
236 1996 SAN PABLO, 2A ETAPA EGF FRACC
237 1996 SAN PEDRITO PEÑUELAS EGF FRACC
238 1996 VILLAS SANTIAGO DE QUERETARO EGF FRACC
239 1997 AMPLIACIÓN LOMAS DEL VALLE JVH FRACC
240 1997 CAMPESTRE ITALIANA JVH FRACC
241 1997 CENTRO SUR JVH FRACC
242 1997 EL SALTO (REAL DE JURIQUILLA) SRJ FRACC
243 1997 EPIGMENIO GONZALEZ EGF FRACC
244 1997 FUENTES DEL CIMATARIO JVH FRACC
245 1997 HUERTAS DEL CIMATARIO JVH FRACC
246 1997 INDEPENDENCIA SRJ FRACC
247 1997 JARDINES DE SANTIAGO EGF FRACC
248 1997 PEDREGAL DE VISTA HERMOSA JVH FRACC
249 1997 PUERTAS DEL SOL II FOS FRACC
250 1997 REAL DE JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
251 1997 RESIDENCIAL ITALIA FCP FRACC
252 1997 SAN FRANCISCO B SRJ FRACC
253 1998  EL PARQUE EGF FRACC
254 1998 CIUDAD SATÉLITE SECCIONES A, B Y C FOS FRACC
255 1998 FRANCISCO JAVIER MINA FOS FRACC
256 1998 FUNDADORES II FOS FRACC
257 1999 BOSQUES DEL SOL FCP FRACC
258 1999 JURICA ACUEDUCTO SRJ FRACC
259 2000 EX-HDA EL TINTERO FCP FRACC
260 2000 FRACC. SANTA CATARINA SRJ FRACC
261 2000 FUNDADORES III FOS FRACC
262 2000 SAN PEDRITO LOS ARCOS EGF FRACC
263 2001 CAROLINA FCP FRACC
264 2001 LA LADERA EGF FRACC
265 2001 LOS CIPRECES EGF FRACC
266 2001 LOS ROBLES EGF FRACC
267 2001 PARQUE COMERCIAL PAPANOA JVH FRACC
268 2002 COLINAS DEL PONIENTE FOS FRACC
269 2002 CONJUNTO BELEN EGF FRACC
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270 2002 EL VERGEL EGF FRACC
271 2002 EURIPIDES EGF FRACC
272 2002 HACIENDA SAN MIGUEL JVH FRACC
273 2002 JARDINES DEL VALLE FCP FRACC
274 2002 PALMARES I (EJIDO EL SALITRE) EGF FRACC
275 2003 ALTAVISTA JVH FRACC
276 2003 ALTAVISTA JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
277 2003 CONJUNTO LOMAS DE PASTEUR JVH FRACC
278 2003 CUMBRES DEL LAGO SRJ FRACC
279 2003 DESARROLLO LA MONTAÑA 2000 SECCION III CH FRACC
280 2003 EL PALOMAR DEL REY JVH FRACC
281 2003 HACIENDA LA GLORIA FCP FRACC
282 2003 LA SOLANA II SRJ FRACC
283 2003 MISION FUNDADORES FOS FRACC
284 2003 PUNTA JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
285 2003 QUINTA ALICIA FCP FRACC
286 2003 REAL DE JURIQUILLA FASE B SRJ FRACC
287 2003 RESIDENCIAL LOS ANGELES FCP FRACC
288 2003 RESIDENCIAL LOS FRESNOS CH FRACC
289 2003 SANTA CATARINA SRJ FRACC
290 2003 VILLAS DE SAN MIGUEL FOS FRACC
291 2003 VILLAS FONTANA II EGF FRACC
292 2004 EL CARMEN FOS FRACC
293 2004 EL REFUGIO EGF FRACC
294 2004 LA ERMITA VCR FRACC
295 2004 LA LOMA VIII FOS FRACC
296 2005 CHULA VISTA FOS FRACC
297 2005 GEO PLAZAS II FOS FRACC
298 2005 JARDINES DE SANTIAGO FRACC. III Y IV EGF FRACC
299 2005 JARDINES DE SANTIAGO SECCIÓN "VISTANA" EGF FRACC
300 2005 LA AURORA COMERCIAL FCP FRACC
301 2005 LA LOMA IX FCP FRACC
302 2005 LA LOMA VII FOS FRACC
303 2005 LOMAS DEL MARQUES "VILLAS PALMIRA" VCR FRACC
304 2005 MISION CIMATARIO JVH FRACC
305 2005 RESIDENCIAL CALETTO SRJ FRACC
306 2005 RESIDENCIAL SANTA MAGDALENA FCP FRACC
307 2005 SAN MIGUEL SEGUNDA ETAPA FOS FRACC
308 2005 SANTA RUTH SRJ FRACC
309 2005 VILLAS DE SAN ANTONIO FCP FRACC
310 2006 AMPLIACIÓN PARQUE INDUSTRIAL 1A FASE SRJ FRACC
311 2006 JURIQUILLA SANTA FE SRJ FRACC
312 2006 LOMAS DE JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
313 2006 MISIÓN CARRILLO FOS FRACC
314 2006 POLÍGONO EMPRESARIAL SRJ FRACC
315 2006 RANCHO BELLAVISTA FCP FRACC
316 2007 EDUARDO LOARCA CASTILLO FOS FRACC
317 2007 LOMA REAL DE QUERÉTARO FOS FRACC
318 2007 LOS HUERTOS EGF FRACC
319 2007 PARQUE SANTIAGO FOS FRACC
320 2007 PASEOS DEL PEDREGAL EGF FRACC
321 2007 REAL DE LA LOMA FOS FRACC
322 2007 VALLE DE JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
323 2007 VILLAS DE MOMPANÍ FOS FRACC
324 2008 COLINAS DE  SAN PEDRO EGF FRACC
325 2008 EL ARCÁNGEL FCP FRACC
326 2008 EL ARCÁNGEL 1 FCP FRACC
327 2008 HACIENDA SANTA ROSA SRJ FRACC
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328 2008 IGNACIO PÉREZ EGF FRACC
329 2008 JARDINES DE SANTIAGO, 4A SECCION EGF FRACC
330 2008 JURICA LA SIERRA SRJ FRACC
331 2008 JURIQUILLA SAN ISIDRO I SRJ FRACC
332 2008 JURIQUILLA SAN ISIDRO II SRJ FRACC
333 2008 LOMAS SAN ÁNGEL FCP FRACC
334 2008 LOS VIÑEDOS FCP FRACC
335 2008 MICROINDUSTRIAL SANTA ROSA SRJ FRACC
336 2008 MISIÓN DE BUCARELI NORTE EGF FRACC
337 2008 MISIÓN DE BUCARELI SUR EGF FRACC
338 2008 PUERTA DE BELÉN EGF FRACC
339 2008 PUNTA NORTE I FCP FRACC
340 2008 PUNTA NORTE II FCP FRACC
341 2008 PUNTA SAN CARLOS EGF FRACC
342 2008 RANCHO SAN PEDRO, FRACCIÓN 1 FCP FRACC
343 2008 RINCONADA SANTA ANITA FCP FRACC
344 2009 EDUARDO LOARCA CASTILLO 2A. ETAPA FOS FRACC
345 2009 EL ARCÁNGEL 2 FCP FRACC
346 2009 FRACC. MONTENEGRO SRJ FRACC
347 2009 FRAY JUNÍPERO SERRA EGF FRACC
348 2009 LA CIMA EGF FRACC
349 2009 LA VISTA RESIDENCIAL EGF FRACC
350 2009 MONTE REAL JVH FRACC
351 2009 PASEOS DEL PEDREGAL II EGF FRACC
352 2009 REAL DE JURIQUILLA FASE C SRJ FRACC
353 2009 SONTERRA FCP FRACC
354 2010 GALAXIA BUENAVISTA SRJ FRACC
355 2010 MISIÓN Carrillo II FOS FRACC
356 2010 PUERTA NAVARRA FCP FRACC
357 2010 RANCHO SAN PEDRO 2 FCP FRACC
358 2010 REAL DEL MARQUÉS FOS FRACC
359 2011 EDUARDO LOARCA CASTILLO 3A. ETAPA FOS FRACC
360 2011 VALLE DE JURIQUILLA II FOS FRACC
361 2012 BELLAVISTA JVH FRACC
362 2013 CIUDAD DEL SOL, SECC. PUNTA NORTE I FCP FRACC
363 2013 CIUDAD DEL SOL, SECC. PUNTA NORTE II FCP FRACC
364 2013 CUMBRES DE JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
365 2013 LOMAS ALTAS  JURIQUILLA SRJ FRACC
366 2013 LOS VIÑEDOS ET. 4 FCP FRACC
367 2013 PALMAS V SRJ FRACC
368 2013 PRIVALIA AMBIENTA EGF FRACC
369 2014 ALTOZANO, EL  NUEVO QUERÉTARO EGF FRACC
370 2014 CIUDAD DEL SOL, SECC. VALLE DE SANTIAGO, SECTOR II FCP FRACC
371 2014 DEL BOSQUE EGF FRACC
372 2014 GRAND OUTDOORS SRJ FRACC
373 2014 MISIÓN DEL MAYORAZGO FCP FRACC
374 2014 PARQUE SAN ISIDRO SRJ FRACC
375 2014 PUERTA DE BELÉN, ETAPAS 3 y 4 EGF FRACC
376 2014 SONTERRA, ETAPA V FCP FRACC
